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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GRADU-
ATED INCOME TAX LAW
Whether under the constitutional power to levy a tax Congress
may impose upon incomes of larger amount a higher rate of
tax than upon smaller incomes, is a question of very grave
importance. The Tariff Act of 1913, in subdivision two, pro-
vides for levying, assessing and collecting an additional income
tax. This additional tax is commonly known as a "surtax."
In the opinion of a great many lawyers this feature of the income
tax law violates that principle of equality which requires that
all taxable incomes, so far as amount is concerned, be treated
alike. To accept without question the doctrine of an existence
of this power in Congress falls little short of c6nceding that
Congress may legally confiscate the property of a citizen.
The following article was prepared a year or more ago, before
announcement by the Supreme Court of the United States (Jan-
uary 24, 1916) of a decision that appears to sustain the constitu-
tionality of the power to impose a surtax. We refer to Brushaber
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., in which the opinion is delivered by
the Chief Justice. The Bar had reason to expect that this long-
looked for opinion would discuss the question that had been
raised as to equality; that it would point out the reasons why
such a principle does not forbid Congress from imposing a
higher rate of income tax, based on the ground that the owner
of the income can afford to pay a larger tax. Their expectation
has been disappointed. All that the opinion of the learned Chief




"It is true that it is elaborately insisted that although
there be no express constitutional provision prohibiting it,
the progressive feature of the tax causes it to transcend
the conception of all taxation and to be a mere arbitrary
abuse of power which must be treated as wanting in. due
process. But the proposition disregards the fact that in
the very early history of the government a progressive
tax was imposed by Congress and that such authority was
exerted in some, if not all, of the various income taxes
enacted prior to 1894 to which we have previously
adverted. And over and above all this the contention but
disregards the further fact that its absolute want of
foundation in reason was plainly pointed out in Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, and the right to urge it was
necessarily foreclosed by the ruling in that case made."
Since this vital question has nowhere been discussed by the
Court with an approach to fulness, we are persuaded that it may
be profitable to set forth the argument which challenges the state-
ment of the Chief Justice that there is an "absolute want of
foundation in reason" for the unconstitutionality of the assumed
power to levy a surtax. Interesting as the subject is from a
political and historical point of view, no less than in its legal
aspect, it is well to let the reader decide for himself whether
the Supreme Court has really disposed of the question to the"
satisfaction of the student of constitutional law.
In order to determine whether Congress has exceeded its
powers in undertaking to impose a progressive income tax, one
must rightly apprehend the origin and the nature of a property
tax. For what reason, we may ask, has the legislature a right
to levy a tax upon the property of a citizen?
The usual answer is-for the support of the government.
That indeed is the object of collecting the money: but why has
the government a right to compel each citizen to pay something?
To what source do we trace the justification of laying a tax?
The reply is obvious:
Every citizen enjoys the protection of his government, as
respects his property. It is fair then that he pay a proportionate
share of tax to meet the expense of what it shall cost to maintain
that government. The amount he is called upon to pay repre-
sents a quid pro quo. A secure holding of property is furnished
by the government. The value of a citizen's property supplies
a standard, according to which his share of the general expense
can be estimated. To be sure, an assessment may not be accurate
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in every instance; but in a rough kind of way property value
may be arrived at, and a fairly just estimate ascertained, upon
which to base the amount to be paid.
Writers upon political economy, as well as judges in their
opinions, are in the habit of designating a tax as a "burden."
Nobody, it is true, derives pleasure from paying a tax-bill. The
circumstance is in some measure to be accounted for by the fact
that seldom has the taxpayer anything to do with deciding how
money raised by taxation shall be expended. There has been,
and there always will be, room for complaint that the tax might
have been lighter, or the money might have been laid out to
better advantage. Hence, we have become used to the expression
"burden of taxation."
The term "burden of taxation" is apt, however, to mislead
us when we come to view the tax from a legal standpoint. An
ordinary tax upon property ought no more to be styled a burden,
than a man's bill for his groceries, or for keeping an automobile,
or-to instance the sharing of a common expense-for his
annual dues at the club. A tax, of course, is an expense; but
the taxpayer has received, or will receive, something for it. He
may not be sensible that the government, all through the twenty-
four hours, has been protecting his life and his property. Yet
if he but stop and think, he will perceive that, provided he is
required to pay his proportionate share, and no more, it is only
right that he furnish the government with the means to meet
such expenses as the state shall incur in his behalf.
An alien, who resides elsewhere than in the United States,
receives the protection of our government, as respects his
income earned in the United States. He is taxed in recognition
of that measure of protection. No one will be found to dispute
the fairness of this plan of procedure.
We repeat that we must not allow ourselves to be led astray
by the use of the term, "burden of taxation." Let us admit that
the proper way of looking at the subject is, to conceive that the
state requires of the citizen a payment of taxes, because the
state has given, or will give, to him, something of value, namely,
protection afforded to his property, and to his right to acquire
property.
This "something of value" naturally enough can be laid hold
of as a standard by which to measure the tax to be levied,
assessed, and collected. The amount of protection in general
afforded a citizen by his government is necessarily incapable of
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exact measurement. But the value in the rough of a man's
property is in most cases attainable. So too the amount of a
person's annual income may in a fair degree be computed. A
normal tax, in the Act of 1913, is levied on net income-irre-
spective of what that income may be worth to the individual
who has received it. So far as the normal tax is concerned, all
are treated alike who have to pay one. We may dismiss a con-
sideration of the size of the exemption. The present effort is
directed solely to a proper estimate of the character of the addi-
tional tax, which is sought to be collected under the system of
a graduated income tax.
With this proposal in mind, let us look into the nature of the
additional income tax which the act undertakes to levy, assess,
and collect, in order to ascertain, if we may, whether it be in
harmony with that principle which affords assurance to every
citizen that he shall enjoy the equal protection of the law.a
Subdivision 2 enacts that besides a tax of one per centum
upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources,
"an additional income tax shall be collected of one per centum
upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds $2oooo,
and does not exceed $5o,ooo," and so on through $75,000,
$0oo,ooo, $25o,ooo, until six per cent per annum is reached on
the amount by which the total net income exceeds $5oo,ooo. How
the progressive feature of this plan of taxation works may be
illustrated as follows:
A has an income of $2o,ooo. B, of $ioo,ooo. They are mar-
ried men, and each is entitled to an exemption of $4,000. A is
required to pay a normal tax of $16o. B pays a normal tax of
$96o. B pays more than A in proportion as his income is larger
than A's.
Under the scheme thus set in operation of levying a tax, we
discover that B is compelled to pay a great deal more than that
which his proportion demands. This sum of $96o pays the
government for all the protection which B has received for his
a The terms "due process of law," and "the equal protection of the
laws," so far as they relate to the property rights of a citizen, may be
regarded as identical in meaning. They can be used interchangeably as
denoting the protection afforded by an application of that fundamental
principle of our polity which assures to every man a treatment by the
legislature of his state, or by the Congress of the United States, which
shall be of a character precisely similar to that accorded every other man
situated in like circumstances. In a word, each term spells equality.
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$io0,ooo. He owes the government nothing further on that
score. Yet B is compelled to pay an additional tax of $3oo and
$5oo, and $750, or a total surtax of $1,550.
One is at a loss to find out upon what principle this require-
ment to pay $,55o is founded. Clearly, B has received no larger
amount of protection from the government proportionately than
has A. From one point of view it looks as though a penalty
were imposed upon B for enjoying a larger income than $2oooo
a year, per annum. Indeed, no other reason for the exaction
seems to exist. This conception of what B ought to pay is all
the more inexplicable when we see that a very large number of
citizens, whose income is $4,000 or a little less than that sum, are
not required to pay anything whatever for the protection which
they have received from the government in respect of their
annual income. Thought of an equality of payment in this act
seems to have been abandoned.
When we turn to other departments of the government, where
the citizen is treated upon a quid pro quo basis, we discover no
inequality. B does not have to pay any higher rate of postage
on his letters, or upon parcels sent by mail, than A.
What larger service has been rendered B as to each dollar
of his income, than has been rendered A? Clearly none. In
every aspect of the case, therefore, an imposition of a greater
percentage upon a larger amount of income is found to be an
arbitrary and an unjust exaction.
"A pretended classification that is based solely on a
difference in quantity of precisely the same kind of prop-
erty is necessarily unjust, arbitrary, and illegal. For
example, a division of personal property into three classes
with a view of imposing a different tax rate on each, class
i consisting of personal property exceeding in value the
sum of $iooooo; class 2 consisting of personal property
exceeding in value $2o,ooo, and not exceeding $iooooo;
and class 3 consisting of personal property not exceeding
in value $2o,ooo, would be so manifestly arbitrary and
illegal that no one would attempt to justify it.' '1
Let us turn to the case of Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41,
decided in 19oo. The legacy tax imposed by the Act of June 13,
1898 (20 Stat. 448) was there brought under review. The Court
held that the tax was laid upon the right of transmitting property
from the dead to the living; and that the fact that this privilege
Per Sterrett, C. J., in Cope's Appeal, 191 Pa. St. 22.
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is granted by a state does not deprive the United States of the
right to impose the tax.
Says Mr. Justice White at page lo9:
"Lastly it is urged that the progressive rate feature of
the statute is so repugnant to fundamental principles of
equality and justice that the law should be held to be void,
even although it transgresses no express limitation in the
Constitution. Without intimating any opinion as to the
existence of a right in the courts to exercise the power
which is thus invoked, it is apparent that the argument as
to the enormity of the tax is without merit. It was dis-
posed of in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170
U. S. 283, 293.2
This language would signify that the objection of a want
of equality as urged in the Knowlton case is without force since
the Magoun case had disposed of any such argument. Such, we
apprehend, is the decision of the Court upon the question of a
progressive tax.
When one comes to examine the Magoun case, he finds that
the Court rest their decision upon the power of the state to
attach any condition it pleases to a grant of the right to inherit,
or to receive property under a testamentary disposition. The
privilege granted to an heir, or legatee, to become the owner of
an estate left by the deceased, is the creation of the state. The
state, therefore, is free to tax that privilege in such manner and
to such extent as it shall see fit.
"The tax is not on money; it is on the right to inherit;
and hence a condition of inheritance, and it may be graded
according to the value of that inheritance." Per
McKenna, J., p. 30o.3
Mr. Justice Brewer, dissenting in the Magoun case, remarks:
"It seems to be conceded that if this were a tax upon
property such increase in the rate of taxation could not
be sustained, but being a tax upon succession it is held
that a different rule prevails. The argument is that
'Mr. Justice Brewer dissented, in the Knowlton case, from so much of
the opinion as holds that a progressive rate of tax can be validly imposed.
(P. iio.)
'It is worthy of mention that when the Magounr case was argued, the
Solicitor General, in his additional brief, at page ii, frankly admitted as
follows: "If this tax be a property tax, it is clearly invalid."
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because the state may regulate inheritances and the extent
of testamentary disposition it may impose thereon any
burdens, including therein taxes, and impose them in any
manner it chooses." P. 3o2.4
'The decision in the Knowlton case, it is to be observed, goes no farther
than to declare that a tax upon a right to inherit, or to take a legacy, may
be sustained, though the tax be graduated, or progressive. In circumstances
of this nature the state may well enough seek to share the good fortune
of a recipient. Probably no one cares to object to handing over to the
state such an amount as the statute names, even though there be a depar-
ture from the strict rule of equality in fixing the amount to be paid by
way of a tax.
The learned Chief Justice, as we have seen, declares in language that
comes very near being a rebuke to him who would think otherwise, that
the "absolute want of foundation in reason" of the objection that the
principle of equality is violated, was plainly pointed out in Knowlton v.
Moore. Yet many lawyers had entertained a belief that Knowlton v.
Moore deals solely with a tax on the right of inheritance, or the right to
receive a legacy-and that it decided nothing with regard to a progressive
tax on property.
The editors of the Columbia Law Review appear to have failed to dis-
cover what it now seems had been "plainly pointed out" by Mr. justice
White in his opinion in the Knowlton case. In May, 1912, speaking of the
Income Tax law, they observe:
"It is apparent that the constitutionality of progressive income
taxation has never been passed upon with reference to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments; that such a rate has been judicially
sanctioned only when applied to an inheritance tax; and that an
obiter dictum, unsupported by authority, is the only Supreme Court
utterance on the question of applying such a rate to a tax on
property." Vol. XII, p. 445.
It is fitting that the remarks be appended here which the writer of the
ovinion in Knowlton v. Moore adds after stating what Magoun v. Illinois
7irust & Savings Bank had "disposed of." The words with which Mr.
Justice White continues may serve to explain what the Columbia Law
Review had in mind when speaking of an obiter dictum:
"The review which we have made exhibits the fact that taxes im-
posed with reference to the ability of the person upon whom the
burden is placed to bear the same have been levied from the founda-
tion of the government. So, also, some authoritative thinkers, and
a number of economic writers, contend that a progressive tax is
more just and equal than a proportional one. In the absence of con-
stitutional limitation, the question whether it is or is not is legisla-
tive and not judicial. The grave consequences which it is asserted
must arise in the future if the right to levy a progressive tax be
recognized involves in its ultimate aspect the mere assertion that
free and representative government is a failure, and that the grossest
abuses of power are foreshadowed unless the courts usurp a purely
legislative function. If a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary
and confiscatory exaction is imposed bearing the guise of a pro-
gressive or any other form of tax, it will be time enough to consider
whether the judicial power can afford a remedy by applying inherent
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While writers upon law or economics may differ as to the
meaning of the terms "just and equal," when applied to the oper-
ation of a statute imposing a tax, it may be said to be generally
admitted that at least a. semblance of equality should characterize
every enactment that lays a direct tax upon the property of a
citizen of the United States. Chief justice Sterrett, in the
opinion already cited, has quoted with approval the following
language of authoritative text-writers:
"It is of the very essence of taxation that it should be
relatively equal and uniform, and where the burden is
common there should be a common contribution to dis-
charge it: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 495. In
his Treatise on Taxation the same learned author says:
'In an exercise of the power to tax, the purpose always
is that a common burden shall be sustained by common
contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule and
apportioned by the law according to some uniform ratio of
equality. The power is not, therefore, arbitrary, but rests
on fixed principles of justice, which have for their object
the protection of the taxpayer against exceptional and
invidious exactions, and is to have effect through estab-
lished rules operating impartially.'
'Equality in the imposition of the burden is of the very
essence of the right, and though absolute equality and
absolute justice may not be attainable, the adoption of
some rule, tending to that end is indispensable. Equality
as far as practicable and security of property against irre-
sponsible power are principles which underlie the power
of taxation as declared ends and principles of fundamental
law.' Desty on Taxation, 29, and cases there cited."
In considering what has been cited from the opinion of Ster-
rett, C. J., it is well to remember that the constitution of Penn-
sylvania, of 1874, prescribes that "all taxes shall be uniform upon
and fundamental principles for the protection of the individual, even
though there be no express authority in the Constitution to do so.
That the law which we have construed affords no ground for the
contention that the tax imposed is arbitrary and confiscatory is
obvious." (P. iog.)
There has thus been laid before the reader the entire language devoted
to the question of the constitutionality of a progressive tax in the sixty-six
printed pages of the reported opinion in Knowlton v. Moore. That there
are those who are slow to discover just where the learned Justice in this
expression of views has "plainly pointed out" what is now termed "the
absolute want of foundation in reason" of the position maintained by Mr.
Justice Brewer, will, we conjecture, be conceded by not a few members
of the bar, and perhaps, here and there, by an editor of a law review.
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the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the taxes, and shall be levied and collected
under general laws."r,
The requirement of uniformity but expresses a fundamental
principle that everywhere prevails in respect to the taxing power.
That a favored class should exist under the law is abhorrent to
the sense of equality which must ever animate the motive power
of a government by the people.
As Mr. Justice Brewer happily phrases it:
"Equality in right, in protection, and in burden is the
thought which has run through the life of this Nation and
its constitutional enactments from the Declaration of Inde-
pendence to the present hour."6
This clear-thinking Justice likewise pronounced the inheritance
tax unconstitutional, since, in his opinion, it was,
"a tax unequal because not proportioned to the amount
of the estate; unequal because based upon a classifica-
tion purely arbitrary, to-wit, that of wealth-a tax directly
and intentionally made unequal. I think the Constitution
of the United States forbids such inequality." P. 303.
The scheme of a progressive tax on income appears to have
originated in the Parliament of Great Britain. Its existence is
to be traced in British statutes as far back as 1797. Yet inequal-
ity we find did not become acquiesced in until after a strong pro-
test. Justification for the adoption of such a feature is to be
accounted for because of a conception in the British mind that
there existed in the Kingdom distinct classes of people-an upper
class with rights and duties growing out of the ownership of the
land (chiefly by inheritance), and the enjoyment of a large
amount of personal property. "Press lightly on the lower orders
of the people," is a phrase to be met with in Dowell's History of
Taxation. It was the upper classes that held the offices. Natur-
ally enough the favored few felt that it was only right and proper
that they should pay a larger share of the taxes, than that which
a proportionate scale would prescribe. In other words, the dis-
tinction between the higher and the lower ordeks of the people
suggested an easy step toward rating a man's tax by his capacity
'Purdon's Digest (iith Ed.), p. 41.
'Dissenting opinion in Magoun v. Trust Co., i7o U. S. 3Ol.
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to pay. Consequently the British taxpayer acquiesced in the plan
of imposing a larger percentage of the "burden" upon men of
wealth.?
The power of. Parliament to impose a graduated tax, of course
is not questioned. Says Mr. Lecky, speaking of a taxation upon
inheritance:
"No doubt the Supreme Legislature in England has the
power of confiscation. But moral right and constitutional
power are different things; and it is one of the worst
consequences of the English doctrine of the omnipotence
of Parliament that it tends to confuse them."
8
Another explanation of the ready acceptance in England of
the doctrine of a graduated tax upon income may be found in the
theory that the citizen contributes of his means to the support
of the government. It is the Commons that votes money. The
Lords have no part in the procedure. The idea prevails that
the vote signifies "a free gift" from the people to the King.
Where the underlying thought is that of a gift, it naturally
comes about that a man of wealth feels it his duty to be governed
by a spirit of generosity. He takes it to be a matter of course
that a gentleman should respond with unhesitating liberality.
One sees how inequality in respect to a tax on income may thus
have come to characterize a usage without its appearing to the
body of taxpayers to be unjust or unfair.
At the same time the British legislature does not fail to recog-
nize equality as an indispensable factor in the framing of tax
laws in general. Wharton, in his English Law Dictionary,
defines a tax by employing the words of Adam Smith (Wealth
of Nations, book V, chap. II):
"The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the
support of the government as nearly as possible in propor-
tion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the pro-
"A similar disparity had long existed in the British Navy in regard to
prize-money. It is related of a British man-of-war's-man, of the olden
time, that just after the decks had been sanded down, preliminary to going
into action, he knelt for a brief prayer. To a ship-mate who asked him
for what he was praying, he replied:
"I was asking that the cannon-balls, like prize-money, may be distributed
chiefly among the officers."
II Democracy and Liberty, 5o.
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tection of the state. The expense of government to the
individuals of a great nation is like the expense of man-
agement to the joint-tenants of a great estate, who are all
obligated to contribute in proportion to their respective
interests in the estate."
Mr. Lecky's treatment of the subject of taxation in England
is worthy of examination, since it helps to a better under-
standing of the principles involved in the present discussion.
Speaking of equality, this acute observer and fair-minded writer
remarks:
"The great majority of serious economists have, I
believe, agreed that, as a matter of strict right, this doc-
trine is the true one. Adam Smith, however, clearly saw
that human affairs cannot, or will not, be governed by the
strict lines of economic science, and he fully recognized
that it may be expedient that taxes should be so regulated
that the rich should pay in proportion something more
than the poor. In England, the system of graduated tax-
ation which I have described has passed fully into the
national habits, and is accepted by all parties."'
It is clear, therefore, that a departure from strict equality, as
illustrated by the English graduated income law, is properly to
be referred to the willingness evinced by the upper classes to take
upon themselves a larger "burden," to make a larger "gift," in
view of the fact that they had retained to themselves a right to
govern. From a like honorable sense of obligation is it that
members of Parliament, until recent times, served without com-
pensation, as did magistrates in the country districts. The sys-
tem, moreover, is the outcome of a stand taken at the time of the
French Revolution, a century earlier, when the democratic idea
had made but slight headway in England. It is a system that
may not be appealed to, at the present day, "as indicating a rigid
adherence to the principle of equality.
These few words of explanation are suficient to dispel any
lurking thought that a graduated income tax is in itself consist-
ent with a design of extending to taxpayers an equal treatment.
The system to which England has accustomed herself cannot be
held up as exhibiting a just and fair method which the United
States may follow to advantage. With us it is hardly necessary
to declare there are no upper classes that govern; or "lower
orders of the people," who are not admitted to take part in the
'I Democracy and Liberty, 342.
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administration of public business. We must not for a moment
forget the salutary rule that we are bound to treat all taxpayers
alike.
After this peculiar method of levying a tax in England had
come to be a familiar practice, writers upon political economy,
who analyzed the income tax law critically, found themselves
hard put to it to demonstrate its fairness and justice. They were
driven to invent an explanation which should reconcile "progres-
sive" taxation with a due observance of the principle of equality.
At last, with a display of not a little ingenuity, some one appears
to have hit upon the term, "equality of sacrifice."
A progressive tax, we are told, is to be supported upon the
plausible theory that ability to pay is the true test of a citizen's
duty to the state, in respect to bearing the burden of taxation.
One does not have to look far to discover that "equality of
sacrifice" is, in truth, no equality at all. The term disguises an
untenable proposal that a man's ability to pay ought to be taken
as a measure of what he should be made to pay. So fantastic
an idea, we need hardly repeat, is wholly at variance with a sound
theory of governmental protection. It is out of harmony with
the genius of our institutions.
The principle of equality in taxation is in itself so just and so
reasonable, and so generally has it been acquiesced in, that no
argument is needed to sustain the position that the legislature in
deliberately violating this principle does nothing else than con-
vert what purports to be a statute law into an exercise of arbitrary
power, which in reality is no law at all. When the question is
put, does a graduated tax conform to the rule of equality, but
one answer can be returned.
Sometimes in judicial opinions it is stated, rather unnecessa-
rily, that absolute equality is not attainable. Of course, the rule
at most demands only such a measure of equality as the nature
of the case shall admit. Where equal treatment can be assigned
to every person coming under the law, the rule is imperative.
For example, a tax upon the realty has always been, and always
will be, laid according to the assessed value of the land. In like
manner a tax upon income ought to be imposed upon the money
value which the income represents. Why should not a citizen
pay a tax precisely according to his income-no more, and no
less? A man whose income is $5o,ooo should pay twice as much
as his neighbor whose income is $25,ooo. So clear is this pro-
posal that it seems a waste of time to advance it. Yet, there are
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legislators who have succeeded in convincing themselves that the
enjoyment of so large an income as $5o,ooo demands of its
owner a larger proportionate payment to the state by way of tax
than is to be required of a less fortunate neighbor. We confess
that we are unable to comprehend how such a departure from
the ordinary course of reasoning on the subject can be rested
upon any logical basis.
To declare that in respect to his income a citizen shall pay a
tax, to be determined not by the amount of that income, but by
his capacity to pay, is to rely upon specious reasoning that will
not bear analysis.' Such a proposal is a mere device to hide the
arbitrariness with which the tax is imposed. Levying upon a
man a tax whose amount shall be larger only because he is seen
to be able to pay thdt larger amount, is an example of empirical
legislation not to be countenanced under our form of govern-
ment. It strikes down equality before the law.
Right here is it that the constitutionality of a graduated income
tax enactment hinges. That a case of unequal taxation is pre-
sented cannot be denied. That the enactment violates a funda-
mental principle in the levying of taxes in order to meet the
expenses of government, is perfectly clear. Once let it be
conceded that Congress can impose a tax, measured not by the
amount of property which is protected by the government, but
by the capacity of the citizen to pay, and the door is opened for
confiscation. Hardly can a situation be conceived where a
thoughtful well-wisher for the health of the body politic must
more keenly feel it his duty to sound a note of caution against
yielding to temptation in its earliest stages, than in the present
instance. The first step taken, a'steady progress thereafter
toward confiscation may not readily be resisted. Nor is the
danger of that character which may be met by the familiar
reasoning that we are not to press an argument founded upon
a possible abuse by the legislature of a power which they possess,
and which they are expected wisely to exercise.
Confiscation, we repeat, may be reached, though disguised
under another name.
Here we may take notice of the language, ut supra, of Mr.
Justice White in his opinion in the Knowlton case. After declar-
ing that the decision in the Magoun case disposes of the argu-
ment as to inequality, the learned Justice is reported as saying:
"The review which we have made exhibits the fact that
taxes imposed with reference to the ability of the person
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upon whom the burden is placed to bear the same have
been levied from the foundation of the government. So,
also, some authoritative thinkers, and a number of eco-
nomic writers, contend that a progressive tax is more just
and equal than a proportional one. In the absence of con-
stitutional limitation, the question whether it is or not is
legislative and not judicial."
A graver question confronts us than the inquiry whether a
progressive tax is more just and equal than a proportional tax.
That question is: Can a progressive tax be pronounced to be an
equal tax at all?
As regards the weight to be given to the views of "economic
writers,"y we need only repeat the remarks of Mr. Justice Peck-
ham, in Nichol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 516, -which remarks Mr.
justice White already (at page 83 of the Knowlton case) has
cited with approval:
"Taxation is eminently practical, and is in fact brought
to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon
its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical
results, rather than with reference to those theoretical or
abstract ideas, whose correctness is the subject of dispute
-and contradiction among those who are experts in the
science of political economy."
A further excerpt from the opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham
denotes in fitting terms a fundamental principle of taxation.
"The question always is, when a classification is made,
whether there is any reasonable ground for it, or whether
it is only and simply arbitrary, based upon no real distinc-
tion and entirely unnatural." 173 U. S. 521.
What sound reason, we inquire, can be brought forward for
treating the payment of taxes after a different manner than pay-
ment for anything else that is received from the hands of the
government,-service of the post, for example. A man pays for
what he gets. A simple rule, which applies throughout the
range of one's expenditures. At times, a rich man buying in
large quantities may pay at a less rate than a poor man. On the
other hand, wealthy parents will reward with a very handsome
fee a physician who has saved the life of their child-an expres-
sion on their part of grateful recognition of the skill and devotion
which he has displayed. But instances such as these do not affect
the rule of which we are speaking.
THE GRADUATED INCOME TAX LAW
If there be any such sentiment as that of "sacrifice" in paying
a tax-bill, a true equality will be discovered in an application of
proportionate figures. To treat as a factor in formulating a
rule, the existence of a superior ability to pay is, as we have
already observed, but to prepare the way for admitting a right
to confiscate. We say nothing of the pernicious effect which this
strange doctrine of "equality of sacrifice" would inevitably have
upon the habits of thrift and industry among our people. We
are content with declaring that it is a theory which has no place
in a state where the property of men is equally protected under a
system of law that in the field of a duty to maintain the govern-
ment, knows no rich man and no poor man.
We are not called upon to point out express words in the Con-
stitution that condemn an attempt to exact a disproportionate
payment. In interpreting the language of the Constitution, it
has long been a settled rule that that which is implied is as much
a part of its provisions as that which is expressed.10
So we may observe of the injunction "nor shall lprivate prop-
erty be taken for public use without just compensation"-that
even had it not been brought into the Constitution by way of an
amendment, the principle would have been applied just the same
in the administration of governmental affairs. An enactment
levying a tax beyond a just and equitable limit is clearly obnox-
ious to the principle of this amendment.
The section providing for a graduated tax, we repeat, is in our
opinion unconstitutional because it violates that rule of equality
which governs every imposition of a tax. The words of Mr.
Justice Brewer deserve to be repeated:
[Such a tax is] "a tax unequal because based upon a
classification purely arbitrary, to-wit, that of wealth-a
tax distinctly and intentionally made unequal. I think the
Constitution of the United States forbids such inequal-
ity.
' ll
It may be urged, however, in opposition to these views, that
Congress enacted a graduated income tax law in 1862 and in
"Ex parte Yarbrough, IO U. S. 65i; South Carolina v. U. S., 199
U. S. 437. Says Judge Cooley:
"The Constitution of Wisconsin provides that 'the rule of taxation
shall be uniform,' which if we are correct in what we have already
stated, is no more than an affirmance of a settled principle of con-
stitutional law." Constitutional Limitations, p. 302.
1170 U. S. 3o3.
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1864; that its power to that effect was admitted by a general
acquiescence on the part of the people. But a season of war
then existed. Every man who owned a dollar of property stood
ready, in that perilous hour, to contribute to the utmost in order
that he might help save the Union. Nobody entertained a thought
of questioning the right of Congress to adopt such war measures
as it should see fit for paying our soldiers and our sailors, and
for meeting all other expenses of the rebellion.
Is it not clear that no argument in favor of the additional
income tax feature of the Act of 1913, can be derived from the
general acquiescence of the people in legislation peculiar to the
war period, and deemed by Congress needful for the safety of
the state?
The Supreme Court have unanimously decided that the Con-
gress is empowered by the Constitution to levy and collect a
super-tax. Unfortunately, the opinion of the Chief Justice fails
to present a convincing reason (or, indeed any reason) why the
doctrine of equality does not discountenance this legislation. The
decision stands. Already certain leaders in the House of Repre-
sentatives have proposed that the enormous sums of money which
will be needed for the increase of the army and the navy shall be
raised by imposing a very heavy tax upon those citizens who
chance to have the largest incomes. No wonder that not a few
people find themselves unable to reconcile such a scheme of tax-
ation with the principle of an equal protection of the laws.
With no lack of respect for the learning and for the foresight
of the jurists now occupying the bench, we are constrained to
repeat that an answer has not been brought forward to the objec-
tion that a graduated income tax enactment sets up a classification
purely arbitrary, and does violence to that principle of equality
before the law upon which the safety of our institutions depends.
In view of this palpable omission, one is well warranted in calling
to mind the familiar saying that no question is ever settled until
it is settled right.
FRANK WARREN HACKETT.
WAS HINGTON, D. C.
